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Abstract 
Title: Contradictory budgeting practice? – An investigation of how psychological and 
economic theory explains the budgetary process.  
Seminar date: May 31, 2017 
Course: BUSN79  
Authors: Andreas Landén Karlsson and Viktor Blidnert 
Supervisor: Johan Dergård 
Keywords: budgeting, goal-setting, agency, psychology, economics 
Purpose: the purpose of this study is to examine how psychological and economic theory 
explains the budgetary process by identifying and analysing the most significant variables of 
each perspective. 
Research questions: will budgeting practice and its outcome be better explained by psychology 
theory or economic theory? 
Theoretical framework: the theoretical approach has been to examine two of the most 
frequently used theories within the area of budgeting, goal-setting theory and agency theory.  
Methodology: this study takes a quantitative approach based on a survey that was sent to 
employees that work with, or are affected by, budgets. Propositions were fashioned after the 
theoretical framework and was statistically tested with nonparametric tests such as Spearman’s 
ranked correlation test, the Mann Whitney U-test and the Kruskall-Wallis test.  
Conclusion: the study does not find any significant correlation between either goal-setting 
theory or agency theory with budget performance. Significant correlation is however found 
between individual variables and budget performance within goal-setting theory. High goal-
clarity seems to have a relationship with higher performance. None of the theories seem to fully 
be able to explain budget performance since none of them seem to comprehend the whole 
picture of human behaviour in the budgeting process. Agency theory is based on controlling 
self-serving people, while goal-setting theory has a more optimistic view of people and 
promotes factors as participation and feedback. To fully explain budget performance, a 
combined approach could potentially better model how to act in order to increase performance. 
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1. Introduction and purpose 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 1 introduces the topic and provides a background 
of the research problem. Section 2 builds a theoretical framework based on two theories. Section 
3 focuses on the methodology of the paper and the description of the process. Section 4 presents 
the results that was found. Section 5 discusses the results in relation to the theoretical 
framework. Finally, section 6 concludes the paper and discusses some of the implications as 
well as presenting limitations and suggestions for future research.  
1.1 Background 
Management accounting research (MAR) has long used theories from other research disciplines 
to study and explain management accounting phenomena. The theories have been drawn from 
behavioural, economics and organizational sciences and have contributed to diversity in the 
field of MAR (Bromwich & Scapens, 2016). Budgeting is one of the subjects that have been 
studied using a wide range of theoretical frameworks. It has been made possible to view and 
study budgeting from different perspectives, but it also means that there are many different 
assumptions and conclusions that are sometimes contradictory. The behaviour and motivations 
that drive the economic(s) man are widely different from the assumptions found in theories 
based in psychology and sociology (Covaleski et al, 2006). This has led to a call for an 
integrated approach to the study of management accounting practice. The argument has been 
that combining the insights may further the understanding of practice, resolve differences in 
assumptions and theory as well as lead to a furthering of knowledge concerning budgeting and 
its effects (Merchant et al., 2003; Covaleski et al., 2006). This paper aims to contribute to the 
current research by using insights and propositions from two theories, one theory based in 
economics and one theory based in psychology research, to study whether budgeting practice 
is better explained by either of the two theories alone or if they reinforce one another. Goal-
setting theory is one of the most cited and used theories to explain performance in a goal 
oriented setting. It has been used in MAR research to understand task performance and what 
motivates high effort (Birnberg et al., 2006). Agency theory has been one of the most used 
economics theories in MAR. It has been used to explain problems caused by the separation of 
ownership and control, dubbed agency problems. In budget research, it has been used to model 
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contracts, explain incentives and behaviour in budgeting as well as the importance of 
information in setting appropriate targets.  
Both theories have been used to explain budgeting behavior and performance. Information is 
important to both theories but from different perspectives. Goal-setting theory emphasizes the 
importance of communication and clarity of information given from management to employee. 
Agency theory emphasizes differences in information between management and employee and 
the effects that the differences have on performance and potential problems that might arise 
from bad information. To study these together could reveal potential interdependencies or 
connections between the concepts of the two theoretical perspectives and maybe provide a 
bridging between economics and psychology in MAR and facilitate a better understanding of 
budgeting.  
1.2 Research question 
Will budgeting practice and its outcome be better explained by psychology theory or economic 
theory? 
1.3 Purpose 
The purpose of this study is to examine how psychological and economic theory explains the 
budgetary process by identifying and analysing the most significant variables of each 
perspective. 
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1.4 Disposition  
Introduction: this chapter will highlight the importance of the chosen research area by pointing 
out a demand for using an integrated approach within management accounting. It will describe 
how budgeting has been examined through individual perspectives that might not suffice in 
explaining the whole picture of budgeting. This discussion will debouch in a research question 
and purpose that frames the angle of incidence.  
Theoretical framework: this chapter will present the two main theoretical perspectives that 
has been chosen; goal-setting theory and principal agent theory. Both perspectives will be 
explained and linked to the budgeting process of companies. This chapter will further provide 
an overview of budgeting from a management accounting point of view. The theoretical 
framework will lead to a presentation of the propositions of this thesis.  
Method: this chapter will present the research design of the thesis. It will explain the choices 
made by referring to methodological literature and previous research. The chapter will provide 
insight into how data has been collected and how the data has been processed to suit the research 
question. The chapter is concluded with a discussion of the validity and reliability of the thesis 
as well as potential sources of error.  
Results: this chapter will present the findings from each theoretical perspectives’ point of view. 
It will start with descriptive statistics and then present the results that originated from the 
different statistical methods that was chosen to examine the data.  
Discussion: this chapter will discuss the results by linking the finding to the previously chosen 
theoretical frameworks. Each framework will firstly be presented individually and then be 
followed by a discussion concerning interesting similarities. 
Conclusion: the final chapter will firstly present a summary of the most relevant findings and 
then discuss some of the limitations of this thesis as well as providing suggestions for future 
research.  
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2. Theoretical framework 
This chapter focuses on the theoretical framework that has been used to examine the research 
question. This section first presents a general picture of budgeting. This is followed by an 
introduction of two main theories on budgeting, in order to look at the topic from two 
perspectives, the economic and psychologic.  
2.1 Budgeting 
The literature on the role of budgeting as a management tool is vast since it has played a key 
role within the subject for many decades and has been used in different areas. Wildavsky (1986) 
defines budgeting as translating financial resources into human purposes. Resources are limited 
and must thereby be allocated among competing people and purposes in an effective way. A 
budget system therefore tries to combine the available information with the essential procedures 
of a company to maintain a well-functional allocation. The main purpose of budgeting is to lead 
the company towards achieving its goals and evading constraints by exerting control in the 
organization. By coordinating efforts, avoiding excess use of resources and improving 
management decisions, budgets are believed to lead to higher profitability (Hofstede, 2012). 
Hofstede (2012) describes budgeting as having four basic functions; authorizing, forecasting, 
planning and measuring. Authorization concerns the expenditure of money (resources), 
forecasting concerns predicting economic key factors, planning concerns the decision-making 
process of carrying out a certain task and finally measuring management’s achievements and 
the efficiency of their performance. 
During the last two decades, the use of budgeting as a tool of control has been a subject of 
significant debate and criticism. Some criticize budgeting for its ineffectiveness and for being 
time consuming, leading to less growth and missed out opportunities because of an inflexible 
way of thinking (Hope & Fraser, 2003). However, there have been some solutions to the issues 
associated with budgeting such as ‘beyond budgeting’, which advocates for the abandonment 
of budgeting to improve the management control process (Hope & Fraser, 2013). Yet, research 
in countries like Finland, the US and Canada reveals that few companies are prepared to 
abandon the use of budgets for other management methods (Libby & Lindsay, 2010). These 
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results indicate that budgeting is still an important function for businesses in spite of large 
criticism. 
Libby & Lindsay (2010) also finds that even though the replacement of budgeting is not 
considered an alternative for the majority, companies in the US and Canada work to adapt their 
budget systems on a regular basis. There is still a consensus that budgeting as a management 
tool has the potential to be useful if appropriately implemented. Since companies are frequently 
affected by environmental changes as well as internal factors, budgeting is often in the process 
of evolving to cover such changes. On the other hand, one could argue for the fact that budgeting 
is better suited for some companies than for those that might place greater importance on 
flexibility and innovation. These facts are some of the reasons for the extensive literature on 
budgeting within management accounting that is still a popular research to this date. Libby & 
Lindsay (2010) conclude that there might not be a universal approach to management control 
in the form of traditional budgeting or beyond budgeting, but rather that it would be more 
rewarding to seek deeper understanding of the processes that are the subject of control within 
companies. 
The way researchers portray budgeting differs a lot from what perspective budgeting is being 
examined from. The three main categories that have been utilized are from the theoretical 
perspectives of economics, psychology and sociology. The different perspectives propose 
different advantages, disadvantages and pitfalls with budgeting, but few researchers cover a 
multidimensional approach (Covaleski et al., 2006). The next sections will present two eminent 
theories taken from both a psychology and economics perspective.  
2.2 Psychology and management accounting 
Psychology research has provided insight to MAR by including factors that have come to have 
great influence in the area, such as attitudes, motivation and behaviour. Psychology differs to 
some extent from other social science research since focus is targeted at an individual level 
instead of an organizational one. Psychology theory has been of importance in explaining and 
predicting the effects of management accounting practices for over 60 years. Several eminent 
researchers have used concepts from psychology research to explain the effects of budgeting, 
and one of those have come to be known as goal-setting theory (Birnberg et al., 2006). 
2.3 Goal-setting theory 
Goal-setting theory is based on the idea that conscious goals have an impact on actions. Locke 
& Latham (2002) address the relationship between the conscious performance goals and the 
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level of task performance. They examine 35 years of empirical research on the subject in order 
to create a theory of goal-setting and task motivation. Locke & Latham (2002) assume that 
goals affect performance by one or several of four mechanisms: 
Goals direct attention and effort toward goal-relevant activities. High goals can arouse effort to 
achieve goals. Goals leads to increased effort persistence. Goals affect action indirectly by 
leading to the arousal, discovery, and/or use of task relevant knowledge and strategies. 
According to goal-setting theory, budgeting is not only perceived as a financial plan but also as 
a device for control, coordination, communication, performance evaluation and motivation. By 
communicating budgeted goals, top management informs employees what it is expected from 
them. In return, top management learns about how employees work, problems they encounter 
and how to accomplish goals. A budget works as a motivational factor since it can be used to 
distribute rewards or punishment based on how well goals are achieved (Kenis, 1979). Kenis 
(1979) studies how budgetary goals affect the characteristics of managerial attitudes and 
performance. He finds four variables which are believed to be linked to performance; budget 
participation, budget clarity, budget feedback and budget difficulty. The independent variable 
is referred to as budget performance and is measured on a self-estimated basis. Budgetary goals 
are considered an important part in improving performance since the process involves 
communication, expectations and evaluation. However, if the process of budgeting is unfitting 
for the task, this can lead to a dysfunctional behaviour that affects performance and attitude in 
negative aspects (Argyris, 1952; Kenis, 1979). The subject of identifying the characteristics 
within budgeting and its effects has been the main reasons for research. 
Budgetary participation refers to the degree to which employees are allowed to be involved in 
the process of creating budgets and setting goals. The process of assigning goals is analysed by 
Locke & Latham (2002) by studying participative goal setting. By examining several studies 
on the topic they find that the relationship between involving people in the process of goal 
setting and performance is ambiguous. Latham, Erez & Locke (1988) find that the difference 
between where top managers assign goals and participative goal setting seems to have little to 
none effect on performance as long as the purpose of the assigned goals is properly explained. 
This is because participative goal setting is assumed to be linked to cognitive benefits rather 
than motivational ones. However, if goals are not explained, participative goal setting leads to 
higher performance. 
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Budget goal clarity refers to the degree to which employees comprehend their goals. A budget 
with high goal clarity is specific and clear in order to decrease potential uncertainty among 
employees in what to do and how to achieve it (Kenis, 1978). Locke & Latham (2002) finds 
evidence that goal clarity is indirectly related to higher performance, especially in a more 
difficult task setting. Goal specificity does not certainly lead to increased performance but rather 
decreases variation in performance by specifying what is to be achieved. This conclusion is 
drawn out of a context where goal specificity is compared to “do-your-best goals”. “Do-your-
best goals” are not found to be as effective since they can consist of a larger range of adequate 
performance levels (Locke & Latham, 2002). Kenis (1979) also finds a significant relationship 
between increased goal clarity and higher performance. 
Budgetary feedback refers to degree to which employees receive feedback when achieving or 
failing to reach their goals. In order for goals to be effective, people require feedback that 
reveals how well they are doing in relation to their goals. When people are given feedback they 
recognize what they need to achieve and direct their effort to match goals. If they fall behind 
their goals, people tend to increase effort as a consequence of increased motivation. (Locke & 
Latham, 2002). This gives guidance, not only for when achieving or failing to reach goals, but 
also to explain variances in performance (Kenis, 1979). According to goal-setting theory, 
feedback is a necessary condition for goal difficulty to influence performance since employees 
needs to know how well they are doing in order to adjust direction of effort. The effect of 
budgetary feedback on performance is in previous research mixed. Against his predictions, 
Kenis (1979) finds that feedback has no effect on budget performance. As a response to this, 
Hirst & Lowy (1990) replicated the study. They found that Kenis approach of using an additive 
model to explain this relationship was insufficient. While still confirming that feedback 
(independently) has no effect on performance, they use an interaction model to show that budget 
goal difficulty and feedback are interacting independent variables that has a positive effect on 
performance when combined. 
Budget goal difficulty concerns how big of a challenge it is to achieve certain budget goals. The 
counter polls of budget goal difficulty are called loose or tight and can affect the motivation 
among employees. If goals are too loose and therefore easily accomplished, motivation is 
believed to have a lower impact on performance. If goals, on the other hand, are tighter and 
therefore more difficult to accomplish they are believed to lead to higher motivation up to a 
certain limit where employees feel frustration or meet failure (Kenis, 1979). The literature on 
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the subject of goal difficulty in a budget context is rather extensive and several studies find 
dissimilar results. 
Kenis (1979), using the additive model, finds no relationship between goal difficulty and 
performance in his approach. As previously mentioned, Hirst & Lowy (1990) counter this 
approach by using an interaction model that shows that budget goal feedback and goal difficulty 
can promote budgetary performance when combined. Atkinson (1958) shows that task 
difficulty is an important factor that is related to performance. He finds that there is a 
curvilinear, inverse function that describes how the level of effort increases with tasks of 
moderate difficulty and decreases with higher or lower levels of task difficulty. In a meta-
analysis, Locke & Latham (2002) counter-proof the conclusions of Atkinson (1958) and instead 
find a positive linear relationship with increasing effort and performance as a result of higher 
task difficulty. Performance level decreased only when goal commitment was inclining or if 
the ability to complete tasks was insufficient.  
 
Table 1.  Goal-setting theory 
2.4 Economics and management accounting 
Economics research has been very influential in management accounting research (Mensah et 
al., 2004). The number of economics based management accounting has declined in later years 
following its peak during the 1970s and the breakthrough of information- and transaction cost 
economics (Bromwich & Scapens, 2016). 
2.5 Agency Theory 
Agency theory views firms as a collection of contracts between one or several principals and 
one or several agents. The principal is someone who contracts an agent to perform a task, for 
example an employer who hires an employee. The principal-agent relationship is not restricted 
to the realm of business but is applicable to any relationship or cooperation where ownership 
and control is separated (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The agency problems stem from the 
assumed differences of interests between the principal and the agent. What is in the best interest 
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of the principal may not necessarily be in the best interest of the agent. This incongruence can 
be explained by how agency theory analyses the individual behaviour and preference. 
Agency theory has its roots in the early 1970s and is based on developments in the fields of 
information economics and micro economic theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Lambert, 2001). 
Agency has since branched out and today it can be said that there exist many different types of 
agency theory. Baiman (1990) identifies two main fields of agency research, positive and 
principal-agent theory. Both are based on the same theoretical foundation, assuming rational 
self-interested individuals striving for maximized utility. The differences lie mainly in research 
focus. Principal-agent research is focused on theoretical-mathematical models to construct 
optimal contracts and utility functions in the principal-agent relationship. The positivist 
research field aims to identify situations and under which agency problems could arise and how 
to solve them. Both fields have been used to provide the framework for empirical research 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Lambert, 2006). The main contribution of agency theory to management 
accounting research and practice has been to supply models from which optimal performance, 
incentive systems and compensation plans can be calculated (Bromwich, 2006). Developments 
in agency theory by Holmström (1979) provided an analytical explanation to why performance 
measures in budgeting are valuable even if an outcome, e.g. budget outcome, is observable. 
Performance measures help the principal in determining the effort exerted by the agent. Thus, 
making it possible to better distinguish to which degree the outcome is due to agent performance 
or other factors. The use of such performance measures is a method to reduce the information 
asymmetry between the principal and agent. The agent’s private information about the effort 
exerted to achieve goals becomes available to the principal by means of performance metrics 
and key performance indicators (Lambert, 2006). 
2.5.1. The economic man 
Both strands of agency research have similar assumptions of the behaviour and capabilities of 
individuals. These assumptions apply both to agents and principals and can be summarized as 
the assumption of the economic man (Fama, 1980; Baiman, 1990), whose main source of 
motivation is the pursuit of wealth and therefore the pursuit of economic self-interest. This 
assumption can be traced back to Adam Smith who argued that the pursuit of individual self-
interest would benefit not only the individual but also society as efficient markets and 
economies guided by the principle of self-interest and the invisible hand would benefit the 
society as a whole (Smith, 2005). Individuals are also assumed to prefer leisure over work, and 
to have the ability to calculate the expected utility of any action (Lambert, 2001; Demski & 
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Feltham, 1978). In the principal-agent relationship this means that the agent will be able to 
compare the utility gained from leisure, i.e. not performing a task, to the expected utility of 
performing the task. To motivate a person to perform a task or a job, it is therefore important to 
provide financial incentives, i.e. compensation, so as to motivate the agent to act in the interest 
of the principal (Lambert, 2001). These assumptions on how individuals behave help explain 
the concepts of information asymmetry and moral hazard which are two of the main issues 
principals are faced with in agency theory. 
2.5.2 Risk attitude 
In agency theory, the individual’s attitude towards risk is an essential factor, which influences 
decision-making. This idea is derived from decision theory and theory of expected utility which 
are both used in economics (Lambert, 2006). This posits that when choosing between 
alternatives an individual will regard the expected utility of any action available to them and 
choose the alternative with the highest expected utility. However, agency theory assumes that 
principals and agents have different attitudes towards risk (Baiman, 1990), and therefore will 
behave differently when faced with decisions that involve risk. The assumptions can be 
summarized as follows: 
• The principal is risk neutral: this means that the principal does not experience either 
increased or decreased utility in relation to an increase or decrease in risk. Therefore, 
the highest expected utility is the preferred option. 
• The agent is risk averse: this means that the agent is risk avoidant, willing to sacrifice 
higher expected wealth in favour of an option with less but certain wealth. 
2.5.3 Agency problems 
The moral hazard problem and information asymmetry are two of the main problems addressed 
by agency theory. Information asymmetry occurs when the agent and principal have different 
access to information. The agent might have better information about his skill-set, the effort 
him or her exercises and other factors that might influence the outcome. In such a scenario, the 
agent has private information to which the principal does not have, but would need, access to 
the budget contract to be optimal (Demski & Feltham, 1978). In a perfect market, all 
information is available to both the principal and the agent. In such a setting, there would be no 
need for budgeting contracts and control since that information would be complete and 
available. In a non-perfect market, where either the agent’s skills or effort is unknown or 
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uncertain, the principal has an endogenous information need, from which the need for 
management controls such as budgeting arise (Demski & Feltham, 1978). 
Moral Hazard addresses the possibility that the agent will not act as agreed or in the interest of 
the principal but will instead act in his or her own self-interest. This becomes possible if the 
principal cannot observe the agent’s behaviour or effort. To avoid moral hazard problems in 
budgeting, the principal needs to provide the agent with sufficient incentives, have proper 
information about the agent’s efforts and capabilities and have the possibility to observe the 
effort of the agent.  
Budget slack is an example that contains both moral hazard and information asymmetry. If there 
is information asymmetry in the budget setting process the agent will have no interest to supply 
information to the principal. Instead the agent might prefer to induce slack in order to avoid 
effort. The budget goal might therefore be set too low in regard to what is actually achievable 
due to the conflicts of interest between the principal and the agent. The solution would be to 
provide an incentive based contract in order to motivate the agent to perform well (Eisenhardt, 
1989). 
The process can be described in the following way:  
1. The agent and principal agree upon a budget contract. 
2. The agent performs a set of actions, thereby providing effort to achieve the budget goals  
3. The outcome (x) and performance measures (y) is evaluated. 
4. The agent is paid, in accordance with the contract and the observed outcome (x) and 
performance (y). 
5. The principal retains the outcome minus the agent’s compensation. 
Empirical studies based on insights from agency research has focused on the relationship 
between budget participation, information asymmetry and slack. Young (1985) found that 
experiment participants built in slack in their budget targets. The amount of slack was found to 
be positively related to the risk attitude of the agent. The more risk averse an individual was the 
higher the level of slack built into the budget. An experiment study by Chow et al (1988) found 
that a truth inducing budget contract based on rewarding agents for sharing information to set 
higher budget target goals. This result supports the idea that budget contracts based on 
economic incentives are useful to control behaviour and information sharing in budget 
participation contexts where there is high information asymmetry between principals and 
agents.  In a study by Dunk (1993) further support for the relationship between information 
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asymmetry and slack was found, where low information asymmetry was related to low slack 
and vice versa. In a survey study by Shields & Young (1993) budget participation and budget 
incentives had a positive relationship with firm wide performance. 
2.6 Propositions 
The following section will provide a summary of the assumptions of goal-setting and agency 
theory, which are then formulated to the propositions that are subject of examination. 
 
2.6.1 Goal-setting theory 
Budgetary participation has no clear relationship with budget performance since it depends on 
the situation where the participation takes place. If assigned goals are not fully understood by 
employees, offering a participatory setting can potentially lead to increased performance (Lock 
& Latham, 2002; Latham, Erez & Locke, 1988). This means that budgetary participation can 
lead to increased performance when comparable goals in a non-participatory setting are not 
properly explained. Budget goal clarity is by Lock & Latham (2002) found to lead to decreasing 
variation in performance, which indirectly affects performance positively. Especially in 
combination with a more difficult task setting. Kenis (1978) finds a direct relationship between 
goal clarity and higher performance. This implies that budget goal clarity can lead to increased 
performance and decreased variation in performance. Budgetary feedback does not lead to 
increased performance when independently examined. Hirst & Lowy (1990) finds that 
budgetary feedback and budget goal difficulty are interactive independent variables that leads 
to increased budget performance when combined. This means that budgetary feedback can lead 
to increased performance when goal difficulty is set on a high level. Atkinson (1958), Hirst & 
Lowy (1990) and Locke & Latham (2002) finds that budget goal difficulty has an effect on 
budget performance in different ways. It either affects performance when combined with 
budgetary feedback or it independently increases performance up to a certain point. This 
concludes that budget goal difficulty can lead to increased performance. 
 
2.6.2. Agency theory 
Although the relationship between performance and incentives is complex in the agency 
literature, there is a fundamental connection between receiving some financial benefit for 
exerting effort, so fundamentally budget based incentives will have a positive effect on 
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performance (Eisenhardt, 1989), even if it the budget contract is not optimally constructed 
(Lambert, 2001). However high performance does not eliminate the possibility that there is 
considerable slack in the budget, caused by information asymmetry and low information 
sharing as indicated by Dunk (1993). Therefore, high performance, relative to budget goals 
might indicate too low set goals, due to slack and moral hazard. Risk aversion also plays into 
the, as higher difficulty might lead risk averse agents to respond negatively by increasing slack, 
share less information and perform in a suboptimal manner.  
 
2.6.3 Propositions 
Based on the theoretical framework, this study will be based on three propositions: 
1. The variables from agency theory can explain budget behavior and performance 
2. The variables from goal-setting theory can explain budget behavior and performance 
Based on agency theory there should be a link between compensation and satisfaction with 
compensation and budget performance.  
3. There is a relationship between variables from Agency theory and goal-setting theory  
Both theories have variables that are based on different forms of information and 
communication in the budget process. Agency problems arising such as slack and moral hazard 
problems might have connection with goal-setting theory variables such as budget goal 
difficulty or participation.  
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3. Methodology 
The third chapter will describe the strategy that has been chosen to examine the research 
question. The thesis will take a quantitative approach and data will be collected by issuing a 
survey. The chapter will cover how the survey has been designed, how respondents have been 
picked and how the data has been processed. Further, it will discuss the validity and reliability 
of the thesis, and is concluded with potential sources of error.  
3.1 Research design 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine what theoretical approach is best suited for explaining 
performance resulting from the budgetary process within companies. In order to draw such 
conclusions this study will take a quantitative approach based on a survey that will be sent to 
employees that are working after or with budgets. The results of the survey will then be used as 
a basis for analysing the propositions that was previously constructed. The choice of taking a 
survey-approach to examining the phenomenon is because it is considered a well-functioning 
way in the context of making comparisons (Hagevi & Viscovi, 2016). It also fits the question 
at issue and has been used in eminent previous research. 
When testing such hypothesizes, it is appropriate to use a quantitative approach. A quantitative 
approach is a standardized method where respondents are answering the same questions. This 
simplifies the process of collecting and comparing data between respondents. The research 
design is characterized by a deductive perspective based on the relationship between theory and 
research. Deductive theory refers to the way researchers, based on existing knowledge and 
theory, deduces hypotheses that are then tested against the collected empirical data. This 
approach is best suited when there are several sources that can be used to assume propositions 
based on the existing material (Bryman & Bell, 2015). We have found various different research 
on both theories examined. Much of this research is written from a perspective where budgeting 
is used to explain the outcome. On the other hand, we have not found research targeted to 
compare the two different perspectives, or combining them to explain why certain variables are 
better fitted in a budget-outcome context. 
We have chosen to use a cross-sectional design, meaning that the study will analyse data 
gathered from a group of individuals at a specific point in time. This design has been chosen in 
order to examine the effects of independent variables upon a dependent variable of interest 
(Bryman & Bell, 2015). 
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3.2 Data acquisition 
During the process of acquiring information on the subject, we used search engines like 
Lubsearch and Google Scholar to find what previous research had already established. We 
found a need for comparing and combining different perspectives on the subject of budgeting. 
By using keywords as budgeting, goal-setting theory and principal agent in the above mentioned 
databases we examined secondary data and built a solid theoretical framework based on 
previous research articles. This was complemented with books and articles that described 
preferable ways of designing a study of this character. The primary data was collected from the 
respondents of the survey. Before the survey was sent out to the respondents, a pilot-study was 
sent out to a smaller group of respondents in order to make sure it was easily interpretable by 
non-professionals in the area of budgeting. The survey was then somewhat revised to better suit 
the prospective respondents. 
3.3 Selection of companies and respondents 
The survey was sent to employees working at a larger number of companies operating in 
different branches. The reason for picking such respondents is the opportunity to capture a 
wider range in order to make implications for the greater population. The employees that were 
given the opportunity to answer the survey was employees that operated after a budget in their 
line of work. In the course of choosing respondents, we contacted 64 employees that fitted the 
criteria of this study. These respondents were contacted via email, phone and social media such 
as Facebook. Out of the 64 employees, we received 33 responses which concluded a response 
rate of 52%.  
The sample of the study was not chosen by the process of simple random selection. A 
convenience sample is used since there is no conceivable technique for identifying every 
member of the population that is being examined. Instead, respondents have been chosen after 
pre-set criteria. We acknowledge the fact that using a non-probability sample will have an 
impact on the generalizability of this study and therefore choose to interpret the result as 
indicators (Lundahl & Skärvad, 1999; Van der Stede et al, 2006). The respondents that was 
contacted was in many cases chosen because of availability. It is important to consider this fact 
since the result can be affected by such a method (Bryman & Bell, 2015). 
3.4 Survey and variables 
The variables that are examined are believed to have an effect on the outcome of the budgetary 
process and have previously been established and used in eminent research. One of the reasons 
21 
 
for using existing variables is because the cause and effect relationship has already been 
established. Seeing as the results will be analysed with mathematical methods for proving 
statistical significance, this study will not be concerned with the common problem of separating 
cause and effect relationships with statistical significance. Based on the variables that were 
identified and considered central, the survey questions were formulated in order to collect 
primary data. The respondents were sent a survey consisting 15 questions which was estimated 
to take four to six minutes to answer. In the process of designing the survey, the number of 
questions and the length of the questions was balanced against how time-consuming the survey 
would be to answer and the number of responses that was estimated. With a greater number of 
responses, the statistical certainty is of greater quality (Lundahl & Skärvad, 1999). 
The purpose of a survey is to collect data with a standardized approach, meaning that every 
respondent will answer the same questions. The preferable way of conducting a survey would 
be if all respondents also answered the questions under similar circumstances. The survey was 
created with Google forms and was distributed via email, so there is no opportunity to control 
such circumstances. However, by using email the respondent can themselves chose the time 
and place and are therefore believed to answer the survey in a comfortable state. When 
respondents are asked the same questions under the same circumstances, the results are believed 
to be of superior quality for the upcoming quantitative processing and analysis (Lundahl & 
Skärvad, 1999). 
The survey is mostly based on closed questions with predetermined response categories on a 
scale from one to seven, where the middle option provide the respondents with a neutral choice. 
This type of Likert scale is optimal to use when the purpose is to capture the opinion of the 
respondents (Hagevi & Viscovi, 2016; Krosnick & Presser, 2010). With closed response 
options, the statistical processing will be straightforward and simplify comparison between 
respondents. The survey also contained one open question in order to capture data that would 
otherwise been lost. The questions of the survey were, when possible, taken from previous 
research (see appendix for a full presentation of the survey). By replicating already used 
questions we make sure to utilize what previous research has already established in order to 
capture the relevant variables. This also opens up the possibility of comparing results with 
previous research (Hagevi & Viscovi, 2016; Krosnick & Presser, 2010). The survey does not 
contain questions of a sensitive nature, but we have still chosen to give every respondent the 
opportunity of anonymity to collect a greater quantity of answers as well as more honest 
answers (Andersson & Halvorsen, 1992). 
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3.4.1 The variables of goal-setting theory 
To measure the effects of goal-setting theory, questions from Kenis (1978) study was replicated. 
The questionnaire of Kenis (1978) was more extensive and our assessment based on the scope 
of this study was that choosing one question per variable was appropriate. Seeing as the 
questions used have already been subject to thorough analysis, we saw no need in the 
operationalization of new questions to measure the chosen variables. The variables are expected 
to be linked to performance and a short explanation of each will be presented below.   
Budgetary participation  
Budgetary participation was measured with the statement “I am allowed a high degree of 
influence in the determination of my budget goals”. This variable is intended to measure to 
what degree employees are involved in the process of setting budget goals. Budget participation 
is believed to lead to increased performance when goals are not fully understood by employees. 
Budget goal difficulty 
Budget goal difficulty was measured with “My budget goals are quite difficult to attain”. This 
variable measures to what degree employees interpret their existing goals as difficult or easy to 
accomplish. Budget goal difficulty is believed to lead to increased performance if combined 
with feedback. Independently examined, difficulty leads to performance only up to a certain 
point. Seeing as the relationship between difficulty and performance seems to be highly affected 
by other factors, we also chose to reverse the budget goal difficulty variable into a new variable. 
The new variable, named budget goal easy, that was created consists of the same data but the 
scale has been reversed so that a higher answer on the Likert scale now represents easier goals 
instead of the opposite.  
Budgetary feedback 
Budgetary feedback was measured with “I receive a considerable amount of feedback about my 
achievements concerning by budget goals”. This variable measures the degree to which 
employees receive feedback in their work of achieving goals in their budgets. Budgetary 
feedback is believed to lead to increased performance if the level of difficulty is high.  
Budget goal clarity  
Budget goal clarity was measured with “My budget goals are very clear and specific”. I know 
exactly what my budget goals are”. This variable intends to measure to what degree employees 
comprehend their goals. Meaning if the budget and the goals linked to budgeting is easily 
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interpreted by employees. Budget goal clarity is believed to lead to increased performance and 
decreased variation in performance.  
The combined goal-setting theory variable  
A variable consisting of the average of all the above mentioned variables was also merged into 
a new variable. It was created in two versions, one including the budget goal difficulty variable 
and one including the budget goal easy variable.  
2.4.2 The variables of the principal agent theory 
Budged based economic incentives 
For the agent to exert sufficient effort, agency theory poses that some form of economic 
incentive or compensation must be available to the agent. This variable measure whether there 
are any economic compensation tied to budget performance. The statement is based on a 
question used by Shields & Young (1993) to measure incentives: “I receive economic 
compensation based upon my fulfillment of budget goals”.  
Incentive driven 
This variable is intended to measure the extent to which the respondent is motivated by 
economic incentives. The primacy of economic incentives to motivate effort and performance 
is a central part of agency theory (Demski & Feltham, 1978). The statement “In my work I 
become increasingly motivated to perform if my performance increases my economic 
compensation”. 
Economic satisfaction 
If the agent is satisfied with his or her economic compensation he or she will excerpt higher 
effort to achieve budget goals (Demski & Feltham, 1978; Eisenhardt, 1989). Thus, this variable 
is intended to measure how the level of satisfaction among the respondents of the survey. The 
statement that is used is: “I am satisfied with my economic compensation”.  
Risk attitude 
This variable measures the risk attitude of the respondents. The statement used in the survey is 
a translation and interpretation of a question previously used in survey research on risk behavior 
by Wärneryd (1996): “I prefer investments with lower but certain return to investments that are 
potentially more profitable but with higher risk”. 
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Information asymmetry 
This variable is the information asymmetry between the agent and the principal. According to 
agency theory information asymmetry gives rise to slack and dysfunctional behavior from the 
agent, which in turn has detrimental effects on performance and budget effort. The statement is 
a translation and adaption of a question used by Dunk (1993): “I have superior information 
compared to my superiors regarding how close my budget goals are to my performance capacity 
limit”. 
Information sharing 
This variable measures the degree to which the agent communicates information to the 
principle. One of the positive effects of a functional budgeting process according to agency 
theory is the flow of valuable information from the agent to the principle.  This is indicative of 
low agency problems, and is a variable that is based on Chow et al (1988) and Dunk (1993) and 
is stated: “In the budget process I share information to my superiors regarding how my budget 
goals corresponds to my performance capacity”.   
The combined agency theory variable  
Mimics the combined goal-setting theory variable in that it combined and averaged the 
agency theory variables to examine if the combined variable better correlated with budget 
performance or any other variables. 
3.4.3 The dependent variable of performance 
The dependent variable used in this thesis is also replicated from the research of Kenis (1978). 
It is self-estimated and measured with the following statement: “I reach my budget goals”. The 
variable is intended to measure the performance of each respondent. Performance have been 
operationalized and defined similarly in studies based on agency theory (e.g Shields & Young, 
1993). 
3.4.4 Other variables  
Gender of respondents  
The respondents were asked to state their gender. This question is asked to examine if the 
respondents are evenly distributed between sexes and that the sample replicates the population. 
Age of respondents 
The respondents were asked to state their age. As for gender, this question is also meant to 
examine if there is an even distribution that replicates the population. With increased age there 
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could potentially be differences in the type of work and position at the work place of the 
respondents.  
Top-down/Bottom-up budgeting 
The respondents were asked to make a general classification of the budget process in their 
organizations in top-down or bottom-up budgeting. This was to conclude if the hierarchical 
structure of budgeting would have any impact on the results. If the respondents set their own 
budget goals that might have an effect on the difficulty as well as reflect differences in 
information.  
3.5 Data processing 
Since the survey used in this study generate ordinal discrete data, the appropriate statistical test 
to use are nonparametric tests. These types of tests have been frequently used to analyse the 
results from surveys that yield non-continuous data (Newbold et al., 2012). Another reason to 
use nonparametric tests is that they do not require the assumption of normally distributed data. 
Furthermore, these tests are appropriate when there is little available data to analyze, which is 
the case for this study which has a total of 33 responses. Spearman’s ranked correlation test was 
used to investigate the relationships, correlation, between the studied variables. The Mann 
Whitney U-test, which is also a rank test, was further used to test groups of respondents based 
on categorical variables such as gender, if the respondents had budget based incentives or top-
down bottom-up budget processes. The Kruskall-Wallis test, a test where more than two 
categories can be examined, e.g “Top-down/Bottom-up budgeting” which had three categories, 
was considered. However, since the data was insufficient, only one respondent was found in 
the bottom-up category of the test, and the one observation, was discarded in favor of the Mann 
Whitney U-test. The tests were chosen after their appropriateness based on the gathered data 
and that they could explore and test the propositions of the study. The tests were performed in 
the software package SPSS and the output was then processed into tables in excel and later 
migrated to the report.   
3.6 Measurement of variables 
One of the most central criteria in research is validity. It is an assessment of whether the results 
obtained in a study meets the requirement of the research method. Validity can be divided into 
external, internal and construct validity.  
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3.6.1 Internal validity  
Internal validity determines the confidence that can be placed on a cause and effect relationship. 
Therefore, it is important to question if there are any alternative causes that may explain the 
observations being made (Bryman & Bell, 2015; Lundahl & Skärvad, 1999; Van der Stede et 
al., 2006). A way of increasing the internal validity is to assess confounding variables in order 
to control or eliminate those from the study. These variables can also be called a mediator 
variable and affects the relationship between the independent variable and the dependent 
variable. This can potentially lead to false correlation between variables and therefore have an 
impact on the analysis of the results (Schlesselman, 1978). To eliminate these variables when 
examining such a broad spectrum is difficult. In this study, variables that are in previous 
research already proven to be of importance are chosen. This is expected to increase the internal 
validity of the study since many of the examined constructs are already operationalized into 
variables. 
3.6.2 Construct validity  
Construct validity concerns the question whether a measure of a concept actually measures what 
it is intended to measure (Bryman & Bell, 2015; Van der Stede et al., 2006). By basing this 
study on the results of a survey this becomes especially important since the measures involve a 
great deal of subjectivity. Again, this is to the uttermost limit controlled by using variables that 
has already been established in previous research. However, the survey questions related to 
each of the variables are in some cases self-constructed. To control the effects of construct 
validity, each construct will be examined and well-defined before being put into context. The 
construct validity was tested by executing a minor pilot-study of the survey before sending it 
out to the respondents. This is important since there are no interviewers to report potential 
problems with the questions when distributing a survey via email (Van der Stede et al., 2006). 
When executing a survey study there are several factors that can have an effect on the validity. 
Evaluation apprehension concerns the fact that respondents may act differently when under 
pressure and provide answers that are false (Rosenberg, 1965). By giving each of the 
participants the opportunity to be anonymous and by sending out the survey via email where 
there is no pressuring time limit, the results are believed to carry little effect from evaluation 
apprehension. Another positive effect with letting respondents provide their answers via a 
Google form is that this excludes potential effects from researcher expectancies and bias, as the 
respondents will have no such influence during the survey. 
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3.6.3 External validity 
External validity is concerned with the possibility of generalizing the results of a study, meaning 
if the results are valid outside of the specific context that is being examined. In order for the 
results to be taken seriously any research design must justify the choices made (Bryman & Bell, 
2015; Lundahl & Skärvad, 1999). Seeing as the process of budgeting differs considerably 
between companies it is most difficult to maintain external validity. There are countless of 
factors that affect budgets both within and between companies. Examples of these factors are 
the reasons behind budgeting, the people involved in the process, how the company is governed 
and the overall goals of budgeting to name a few. Seeing as these differences are so many, the 
external validity of any study examining budgeting can be questioned. This is due to the fact 
that the sample that has been chosen is considered a convenience sample. Due to a limited 
timeframe, we do not intend for the results to be generalizable to the whole population but rather 
to open up an area of research that has previously been overlooked, and provide different 
stakeholders with indications. The purpose of this study is to examine what theoretical 
perspective that better explains the process of budgeting. In order to achieve a higher degree of 
external validity and to provide conclusions that can be extended to make predictions about the 
entire population, more respondents are called for. Because of the narrow timeframe, this study 
will not be able to cover the full spectra of potential respondents. Although the sample size can 
be considered relatively small, our emphasis has been placed on picking a fewer number of 
employees that are spread across different branches and companies.   
3.7 Reliability 
The reliability of a study is concerned with if the results would be the same if replicated. If the 
result is affected by coincidence the study is not considered to have produced reliable results. 
When taking a quantitative approach, the question about reliability becomes central since a 
major concern is to assess if the measures used are stable (Bryman & Bell, 2015; Lundahl & 
Skärvad, 1999). This study clearly describes the data acquisition process and how the data has 
been processed, thanks to which the reliability is expected to be satisfactory. Although seeing 
as the results are based on a survey where respondents subjectively assess questions, there is 
still reason for concern about future attempts to replicate the results. This matter is somewhat 
out of the grasp of the researchers since random influences cannot be controlled. The variables 
used are, as previously mentioned, already established and the propositions are based on the 
findings of several other researchers. Seeing as the reliability of the expected relationships has 
already been confirmed, the difficulty instead lies in operationalizing these variables into survey 
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questions. The questions in a survey can be referred to as instruments for measuring a certain 
variable, and need to give an accurate result which shows consistency when replicated. In order 
to achieve high internal reliability, researchers repeat the experiment on the same and different 
samples, but because of lack of time this test-retest method is not within the scope of this study. 
There will always be some disparities when examining a phenomenon within the realm of social 
science because of random factors and natural fluctuation (Hagevi & Viscovi, 2016). 
3.8 Methodological considerations 
A potential source of error due to the survey approach can arise if the respondents give 
untruthful answers. This may be a consequence because employees are afraid of criticizing the 
company and its leadership. Respondents may also have been affected by time pressure and 
therefore answered the survey without greater consideration. This can have an effect on both 
internal and external validity, and reliability (Lundahl & Skärvad, 1999). A problem with using 
a Likert scale in the survey is related to acquiescence. Respondents have a tendency of 
providing positive answers that they believe the researchers wants to obtain (Hagevi & Viscovi, 
2016). To a great extent, this has been covered by offering respondents anonymity and the 
possibility to finish the survey at a time of their own liking, but it is still important to consider. 
Another potential source of error was discovered before the survey was sent to the respondents. 
During the process of the pilot-study, we realized that some of the respondents had issues with 
interpreting some of the questions. In order to hedge for the risk of receiving answers for 
questions that was not fully understood, we revised some questions in order to make it easier to 
understand. 
As previously discussed, the response rate was 52%. According to Van der Stede et al. (2006), 
a response rate between 75% and 90% usually provides reliable results and should be regarded 
with caution if below 50%. This can potentially have a negative effect on the external validity 
of the study since a low response rate can produce biased samples. To achieve a higher response 
rate, researchers can employ follow-up procedures. In the case of this study this is not 
considered due to the narrow timeframe.  
The survey is based on a subjective measurement of performance. This does not necessarily 
mean that it is to be viewed as a poor indicator of performance compared to objective measures, 
but should still be taken into consideration. It could potentially have an effect on the reliability 
of the study (Van der Stede et al., 2006). The effect is considered to be small as previous 
research on the area also utilizes subjective measures of performance. 
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4. Results 
The fourth chapter will present the findings from the statistical methods chosen, starting with 
descriptive statistics for the respondents. This chapter will then present the findings for each 
theoretical perspective by exhibiting charts for correlation between variables. The chapter will 
be concluded with a presentation of the results of the Mann-Whitney tests.  
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
The survey was answered by 33 respondents and all the responses was fully completed, which 
means that there was no loss of respondents due to incomplete surveys.  
Age of respondents 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
2. Age 33 23 60 33,70 12,246 
Valid N (listwise) 33     
 
The survey was answered by 33 respondents whose age differed between 23 and 60 years old. 
The mean of the age of the respondents was close to 34 years old.  
Gender of respondents  
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid Woman 14 42,4 42,4 42,4 
Man 19 57,6 57,6 100,0 
Total 33 100,0 100,0  
 
Of the 33 respondents, 14 (57,6%) were men and 19 (42,4%) were women. This shows that the 
gender distribution was relatively spread between sexes. 
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Bottom-up / Top-down 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid Bottom Up 1 3,0 3,0 3,0 
Mixed 8 24,2 24,2 27,3 
Top-Down 24 72,7 72,7 100,0 
Total 33 100,0 100,0  
 
The question about how budget goals are determined in the companies reveals that most of the 
respondents (72,7%) are given goals that are assigned by top-management. Few of the 
respondents (3%) are allowed to determine their goals by their selves and 24,2% decide their 
budget goals together with top-management.  
4.2 Goal-setting  
The responses reveal a relatively small spread in the results of the survey. The standard 
deviation is similar for the variables that measure budget participation, budget feedback and 
budget goal clarity. Budget goal difficulty shows a lower standard deviation. The mean is 
similar for each of the variables and varies above four. 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Budget Participation 33 1,0 7,0 4,364 1,7106 
Budget Goal Difficulty 33 2,0 7,0 4,030 1,2621 
Budgetary Feedback 33 1,0 7,0 4,182 1,6669 
Budget Goal Clarity 33 1,0 7,0 4,606 1,6572 
Valid N (listwise) 33     
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 Correlation Budget 
Participation 
Budget 
Goal  
Difficulty 
Budgetary 
Feedback 
Budget 
Goal 
Clarity 
Budget 
Performance 
Goal 
Setting 
Spearman's 
rho 
Budget 
Participation 
Correlation  1 -0,033 -0,018 0,047 -0,074 ,467** 
Sig.  . 0,855 0,921 0,795 0,682 0,006 
N 33 33 33 33 33 33 
Budget Goal 
Difficulty 
Correlation  -0,033 1 0,096 -0,079 -0,135 ,363* 
Sig.  0,855 . 0,595 0,663 0,455 0,038 
N 33 33 33 33 33 33 
Budgetary 
Feedback 
Correlation  -0,018 0,096 1 ,446** 0,343 ,703** 
Sig. 0,921 0,595 . 0,009 0,051 0 
N 33 33 33 33 33 33 
Budget Goal 
Clarity 
Correlation  0,047 -0,079 ,446** 1 ,391* ,641** 
Sig.  0,795 0,663 0,009 . 0,024 0 
N 33 33 33 33 33 33 
Budget 
Performance 
Correlation  -0,074 -0,135 0,343 ,391* 1 0,245 
Sig.  0,682 0,455 0,051 0,024 . 0,17 
N 33 33 33 33 33 33 
Goal Setting Correlation  ,467** ,363* ,703** ,641** 0,245 1 
Sig.  0,006 0,038 0 0 0,17 . 
N 33 33 33 33 33 33 
 
When examining how the independent variables correlate to the dependent variable the results 
display one variable that has a significant correlation at a 0.05 level, while the rest shows no 
significance.   
The variable that is measuring budget participation displays a negative relationship with 
performance but at with a p-value of 0,682. Meaning there is no statistical significance. 
32 
 
Budget goal difficulty also shows a negative relationship without significance with a p-value 
of 0,455.  
Budgetary feedback shows a relatively high positive relationship with performance, with a 
correlation coefficient that equals to 0,343. The p-value is 0,051, meaning that the variable is 
very close to statistical significance at a 5% level.  
Budget goal clarity also shows a high positive relationship with performance, with a correlation 
coefficient that equals to 0,391. The p-value is 0,024, which shows that the relationship is of 
statistical significance at a 5% level. The correlation also reveals a relationship between budget 
goal clarity and budgetary feedback. The variables have a positive relationship with a 
correlation coefficient of 0,446 and a p-value of 0,009. This result is significant at a 1% level 
and thus indicates that they are connected. 
The merged variable which represents the average overall variable for the goal-setting theory 
(including the budget goal difficulty variable) shows no significance with performance with a 
correlation coefficient of 0,245 and a p-value of 0,170.  
Correlation  
Budget 
Performance 
Goalsetting 
easy 
Budget 
Participation 
Budgetary 
Feedback 
Budget Goal 
Clarity 
Budget 
Goal easy 
  Goalsetting 
easy 
Correlation  ,359* 1 ,447** ,646** ,704** 0,312 
Sig.  0,04 . 0,009 0 0 0,077 
N 33 33 33 33 33 33 
Budget Goal 
easy 
Correlation  0,135 0,312 0,033 -0,096 0,079 1 
Sig. 0,455 0,077 0,855 0,595 0,663 . 
N 33 33 33 33 33 33 
 
When examining the reversed variable of budget goal difficulty that is called budget goal easy, 
the results show no significant correlation with either performance or the other variables. 
Although when the merged overall average variable of goal-setting theory includes budget goal 
easy instead of difficulty the results indicates a significant relationship between the goal-setting 
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theory and performance. The results display a correlation coefficient of 0,359 with a p-value of 
0,40. 
4.3 Agency theory 
The variables from agency theory have median and mean values that are relatively high, ranging 
from 4 to 6 out of the possible maximum of 7. 
The variables Incentive driven and Risk aversion both have median values of 6, which is high 
considering the maximum possible value of 7. The variable incentive driven shows the highest 
median and mean values at the same time having the lowest standard deviation of 1,1315 of the 
variables. The low standard deviation is indicative of a relatively low spread in answers between 
the respondents. The economic satisfaction variable shows lower median and mean values 
while having the second lowest standard deviation of 1,2371. The two information related 
variables, information sharing and information asymmetry both have the highest range between 
answers, between 1 and 7 but with information asymmetry having a higher standard deviation 
as well as having a higher mean and median value. 
Descriptive Statistics 
    Incentive 
Driven 
Economic 
Satisfaction 
Risk Aversion Information 
Asymmetry 
Information 
Sharing 
N 
 
33 33 33 33 33 
Mean   6,03 4,303 5 4,727 4,333 
Std. Error of Mean   0,197 0,2153 0,2752 0,2863 0,2289 
Median   6 4 6 5 4 
Std. Deviation   1,1315 1,2371 1,5811 1,6446 1,315 
Variance   1,28 1,53 2,5 2,705 1,729 
Range   4 4 5 6 6 
Minimum   3 3 2 1 1 
Maximum   7 7 7 7 7 
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Correlation 
Spearman's rho 
 
Incentive 
Driven 
Economic 
Satisfaction 
Risk 
Aversion 
Information 
Asymmetry 
Information 
Sharing 
Budget 
performance 
Incentive Driven Correlation  1,000 ,288 -,222 ,208 ,183 ,034 
 
Sig.   ,104 ,214 ,245 ,307 ,853 
  N 33 33 33 33 33 33 
Economic 
Satisfaction 
Correlation  ,288 1,000 -,112 -,088 ,320 ,095 
  Sig. ,104   ,534 ,626 ,070 ,598 
  N 33 33 33 33 33 33 
Risk Aversion Correlation  -,222 -,112 1,000 ,122 ,057 -,004 
 
Sig. ,214 ,534   ,501 ,752 ,982 
  N 33 33 33 33 33 33 
Information 
Asymmetry 
Correlation  ,208 -,088 ,122 1,000 ,169 ,126 
  Sig. ,245 ,626 ,501   ,347 ,484 
  N 33 33 33 33 33 33 
Information 
Sharing 
Correlation  ,183 ,320 ,057 ,169 1,000 -,150 
 
Sig. ,307 ,070 ,752 ,347   ,404 
  N 33 33 33 33 33 33 
Budget 
performance. 
Correlation  ,034 ,095 -,004 ,126 -,150 1,000 
  Sig ,853 ,598 ,982 ,484 ,404   
  N 33 33 33 33 33 33 
 
The results do not show a significant correlation between any of the agency theory variables 
and budget performance. Thus, the proposition that agency theory can explain budget 
performance is not supported by the results from this test.  
No other significant results were found between the agency variables. One correlation was close 
to being significant at the 5% level. Economic satisfaction and information sharing has a 
correlation coefficient of 0,320 which would be significant at the 7% level. The correlation 
would point to a relationship between being satisfied with economic compensation and the 
willingness to share information in the budget process. 
Two of the agency theory variables showed significant correlations with variables from goal-
setting theory. Information asymmetry and budget goal clarity have a correlation coefficient of 
0,368 which is significant at the 5% level. 
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Correlation 
 
Budget Goal Clarity 
Information Asymmetry Correlation ,368* 
  Sig. ,035 
 
N 33 
 
Economic satisfaction and budgetary feedback have a correlation coefficient of 0,347 with a 
significance at the 5% level. 
Correlation 
 
Budgetary Feedback 
Economic Satisfaction Correlation ,347* 
  Sig. ,048 
 
N 33 
 
These two results indicate connections between the two theories which in part can be said to 
support proposition 3, that there are connections between the variables of the two theories.  
4.4 Mann Whitney U-test 
The Mann Whitney U-test was used to test whether there was a significant difference in answers 
between groups of respondents. The first grouping variable that was tested was budget based 
incentives, in order to see if having an economic compensation tied to achieving the budget 
goal had any significant impact, corresponding to a significant difference in ranks between the 
two groups. 
 
 
Grouping 
Variable: 
Budget 
based 
incentives 
Budget 
Participati
on 
Budget 
Goal 
Difficul
ty 
Budgeta
ry 
Feedbac
k 
Budget 
Goal 
Clarity 
Incenti
ve 
Driven 
Economic 
Satisfacti
on 
Risk 
Aversio
n 
Informati
on 
Asymmetr
y 
Informati
on 
Sharing 
Budget 
performan
ce 
Mann-
Whitney 
U 
52,500 76,000 85,000 79,000 37,000 89,000 86,500 64,500 81,000 76,000 
Wilcoxo
n W 
403,500 104,000 436,000 107,00
0 
388,00
0 
117,000 114,50
0 
415,500 432,000 427,000 
Z -1,725 -,688 -,270 -,539 -2,530 -,091 -,206 -1,195 -,453 -,689 
Asymp. 
Sig.  
,085 ,492 ,787 ,590 ,011 ,927 ,837 ,232 ,651 ,491 
Exact 
Sig. 
,090b ,531b ,813b ,620b ,016b ,949b ,846b ,249b ,682b ,531b 
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The results show that there was one case where the null-hypothesis (that there was no significant 
difference) could be discarded. The respondents who worked with budgets that had some form 
of economic compensation showed a significantly higher degree of being economically 
motivated/Incentive driven. The result showed to be significant at 1,6% level, exceeding the 
5% level, with a U-score of 37. The mean rank for the group without incentives was 14,92 while 
it was 24,71 for the group that had incentives tied to the budget. The test revealed that 
respondents who had budget based incentives also had more budget participation, although not 
significantly so. The mean rank for budget participation was 22,5 for those with budget based 
incentives versus 15,52 for those without, with a significance level of 9%. There was no 
significant impact on budget performance which points against proposition 1, which in line with 
agency theory posits that budget based incentives are important to motivate performance. 
Another test was conducted with gender as a grouping variable to see if there were any 
significant differences between respondents based on their gender identity. This test rendered 
no significant results.  
A test was conducted to study if those of the respondents who had reported high scores of either 
a 6 or a 7 on budget performance differed significantly from the other respondents, with a score 
of 5 or lower. For this a binary variable was created that grouped those that answered 6 or 7 
together into one category and the other respondents into one category.  
Grouping 
variable: 
Budget 
Performanc
e 
Budget 
Participatio
n 
Budget 
Goal 
Difficult
y 
Budgetar
y 
Feedback 
Budget 
Goal 
Clarity 
Incentiv
e Driven 
Economic 
Satisfactio
n 
Risk 
Aversio
n 
Informatio
n 
Asymmetry 
Informatio
n Sharing 
Mann-
Whitney U 
127,500 115,500 77,000 74,000 127,000 121,000 112,000 101,000 113,500 
Wilcoxon W 218,500 206,500 287,000 284,00
0 
337,000 331,000 322,000 311,000 204,500 
Z -,094 -,556 -1,992 -2,106 -,118 -,343 -,688 -1,094 -,625 
Asymp. Sig. ,925 ,578 ,046 ,035 ,906 ,731 ,491 ,274 ,532 
Exact Sig.  ,928b ,598b ,052b ,040b ,928b ,758b ,524b ,298b ,548b 
 
The results from this test closely resembles the result from the correlation test, where budget 
goal clarity and budgetary feedback had close correlations with budget performance. The mean 
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rank for high performers was significantly higher at 21,31 versus 14,20. This test reaffirms the 
significant relationship between budget goal clarity and budget performance, and show that 
budgetary feedback and high budget performance have a close to significant relationship. The 
mean rank for high performers was 21,08 compared to 14,35 for the non-high performers.   
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5. Analysis 
The following section will examine how the results are linked to the theoretical framework and 
the propositions that was previously constructed, as well as any other implications for 
budgeting. 
5.1 Goal-setting theory 
Budgetary participation has a negative relationship with performance but displays no significant 
correlation with budget performance. This is somewhat supported by previous research which 
shows that the effect of the variable is dependent on how clearly goals are presented by top-
management. This could potentially imply that the workplaces of the respondents that have 
been examined have a well-functioning process when it comes to setting informative and well 
described goals. Previous research has not thoroughly examined the relationship between the 
variables of goal clarity and budgetary participation but still implies that coherent and 
understandable goals have an effect on how participation affects budget performance. The 
descriptive statistics shows budget goal clarity as having the highest mean value in the survey 
compared to the other variables examined within goal-setting theory. According to what has 
previously been presented this could theoretically be one of the reasons of why budgetary 
participation seems to have no impact on budget performance.  
Budget goal difficulty shows no significant relationship with budget performance. Previous 
research is ambivalent in its effect but mostly shows a positive relationship. Some researchers 
suggest that goal difficulty only has a positive effect up to a certain level and then decreases 
when the level of difficulty makes budget goals unachievable for employees. Other research 
indicates that the positive effect only prevails when budget goal difficulty is combined with 
budgetary feedback. The mean value of budget goal difficulty in the survey is 4,0, which means 
that the average respondent considers their goals neither as difficult or easy to accomplish. In 
this case, this could explain why there seem to be no relationship with budget performance. 
Other research suggest that budget goal difficulty must be combined with budget feedback in 
order to have a positive effect on budget performance. The results of this thesis does not validate 
these findings. Budgetary feedback comes very close to showing a significant positive 
relationship with budget performance but shows no relationship with budget goal difficulty. 
The reversed variable of budget goal difficulty also shows no relationship to either budget 
performance or budgetary feedback, which is expected granted the reasoning presented above.  
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Budgetary feedback shows a positive correlation with budget performance that comes close to 
a significant level with a p-value of 0, 51. Previous research indicates that feedback has no 
effect on budgetary performance when examined individually but needs to be combined with 
higher budget goal difficulty in order to have an effect. The results demonstrate that the 
respondents budget goal difficulty is not considered high with a mean of 4,0 on the scale. Seeing 
as using an interactive model to examine these two variables lies outside the scope of this thesis, 
this cannot be confirmed. Instead, the results show that that budgetary feedback could 
potentially be an important factor in improving budget performance. This seems reasonable 
since budgetary feedback can be used to direct employee attention to what is really important 
in order to achieve goals. Without feedback being present in workplaces, employees might 
focus on the wrong tasks and fail to consider new approaches to problems that might be 
occurring in their line of work.  
The results show a positive significant correlation between budget goal clarity and budget 
performance. This is supported by previous research which also finds that budget performance 
is increased due to both higher performance and lowered variance in performance. This finding 
was expected since budget goal clarity can be used as a tool to decrease uncertainty. If 
employees fail to understand what goals they need to achieve it is not unexpected if they fail to 
meet them, therefore having an effect on performance. Previous research compare specificity 
in goals with “do-your-best goals” when drawing such conclusions. When employees are given 
the option to perform at a self-estimated level they might lose motivation since they have a 
larger variety of goal-levels to choose from that is still considered satisfactory in the eyes of the 
employee. The results also show a significant positive relationship on a 1% level between 
budget goal clarity and budgetary feedback. This relationship has not been previously 
discovered or handled by the literature that has been examined, but budgetary feedback and 
budget goal clarity is quite similarly described in the literature. The main purpose for them both 
is to provide employees with sufficient information about their goals. Budgetary feedback is 
focused on how to achieve goals and budget goal clarity is more focused on what to achieve. It 
is difficult to determine the cause of this relationship. One suggestion is that budgetary feedback 
from supervisors might include better information about goals and therefore strengthen budget 
goal clarity among employees.  
As for the merged variable for goal-setting theory, no significant correlation with increased 
budget performance was found. Previous research has not examined the combination of 
variables in goal-setting theory but since this thesis compares two different theoretical 
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frameworks, such an approach could potentially be useful. The correlation coefficient shows a 
positive correlation between goal-setting theory and performance, but because of its’ p-value 
of 0,17 no legitimate conclusions can be drawn. A very interesting finding on the other hand, 
is that when the goal-setting variable is constructed with the budget goal easy variable instead 
of budget goal difficulty, the results shows a correlation coefficient of 0,359 that is significant 
on a 5 % level. This means that a positive relationship is found between goal-setting theory and 
budget performance when the survey question is reversed. When examining the budget goal 
easy variable independently, there is no significant correlation with budget performance though. 
This might suggest interacting variables that act in different ways then what previous research 
has found. When looking at goal-setting theory as a whole to explain performance in companies, 
a lower difficulty level might be favourable when it is combined with the other factors that are 
being examined in this thesis, but not when used as a way of increasing performance 
independently. It is problematic to draw conclusions of how goal difficulty works in a practical 
context. In one way, a lower level of difficulty could make goals easier to reach and therefore 
increase performance, seeing as the measurement of performance is based on a self-determined 
variable of how employees consider their performance. On the other hand, some literature 
suggests that higher difficulty is needed to motivate employees and that they would perform 
better because of the pressure that is being laid on them. This could in fact depend on the choice 
of measurement for performance. If the correlation would instead be based on a measurement 
of performance that is linked to actual objective accomplishment within the employees’ line or 
work, the results could potentially be different. 
5.2 Agency theory  
The results of this study were not able to support the proposition that agency theory can 
accurately predict or explain budget performance. The results from both the correlation test and 
Mann Whitney U-test did not show any significant results regarding the agency variables. 
Previous modeling, as done by Demski & Feltham (1978) and Lambert (2001) are theoretically 
complex when it comes to the effects of incentives on performance. However, there should be 
a connection between economic variables and performance according to theory. 
Even though the agency variables failed to show any significant correlation with budget 
performance the variables from agency theory can still be said to be relevant to take into account 
in budgeting. Agency theory can be said to have done well in providing an understanding of 
some of the behaviors and motivations present in people working with budgets. Looking at the 
results from the descriptive statistics the concept of the agency theory’s “economic man” is 
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supported in that the respondents did think economic incentives was an important factor and 
that there seemed to be a tendency to be risk averse. The high median and mean values of the 
agency theory variables coupled with the low relationship with performance might suggest that 
the variables are more useful to explain other elements of budgeting. As previous empirical 
research has focused more on agency problems in budgeting (Shields, 1985; Dunk, 1993).  The 
finding that respondents who had some form of budget based incentive was also significantly 
more incentive driven has no direct explanation in theory. Where incentives are held to be a 
constant drive in all people. In practical terms the implication might be that introducing 
financial incentives to budget goals might make people more incentive driven, assuming that 
the casual relationship runs in that direction.  
The almost significant relationship between economic satisfaction and information sharing does 
have support in agency theory. One of the reasons to provide incentives, and improve the 
agent’s financial compensation, is to make the agent more willing to provide valuable 
information, thus decreasing the information asymmetry. 
Proposition 3, that there would be connections and relationships between the two theories was 
supported in two cases. Two significant results were found in the correlations test. Information 
asymmetry and budget goal clarity were found to have significant positive relationship. This 
suggests that respondents who regarded their budget goals as clear and easy to understand also 
had better information compared to their superiors regarding how well the budget goals 
corresponded with their performance capacity. This can be said to form a link between the two 
theories. Both variables deal with information that the parties in a budget setting process has. 
Having good information about the goal might make it easier to compare it to one’s capacity.  
According to goal-setting theory high budget goal clarity can result in improved performance, 
as found in this study. However, in agency theory, high information asymmetry might result in 
slack and sub-optimal performance. So, the correlation is complex to evaluate from a normative 
standpoint. The relationship might be important in improving the, stepwise, budget process. As 
high information asymmetry can be mitigated by information sharing. Further investigation into 
what might facilitate respondents to share their private information, given that their budget 
goals are clear, might improve budget performance and form the basis for further research. 
Because clear understanding leads to higher performance, less information asymmetry might in 
turn lead to better set goals that, if clearly understood, can further improve performance. This 
link would have a firm basis in both theories.    
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Another connection that was found was between budgetary feedback and economic satisfaction. 
This result is hard to analyse from a theoretical standpoint. According to agency theory 
economic satisfaction should rather be related to budget based incentives. This result somewhat 
rejects the notion of the self-interested, economically rational, agent as suggested in agency and 
economics theory. Where a clear connection between compensation, effort and satisfaction can 
be said to exist (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Demski & Feltham, 1978).  
However, a possible explanation, although being purely hypothetical, is that receiving feedback 
improves the general level of satisfaction, which in turn affects economic satisfaction. The fact 
that economic satisfaction might be the result of non-economic factors might indicate that there 
is further carry over between psychology and economics evident in the theories. 
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6. Conclusion 
This paper has studied how psychological and economic theory explains the budgetary process 
by identifying the most significant variables of each perspective. When examining budget 
performance out of a goal-setting perspective, the analysis shows results that both align with 
and contradicts previous research. The proposition for this theory is based on the fact that the 
variables that are often used within goal-setting theory can to some extent explain budget 
behaviour and performance. This study does not find a significant connection between goal-
setting theory and performance. Budgetary participation and budget goal difficulty shows no 
significant relationship to budget performance when examined individually but this can in fact 
be a result of other factors such as the need for a combination of certain variables in order for 
the individual variables to have an effect. Budgetary feedback comes very close to showing a 
positive significant relationship to budget performance which implicates that employees can 
take advantage of feedback in their work. The purpose of budgetary feedback and goal clarity 
is very similarly defined in goal-setting theory and this study also finds a positive significant 
correlation between goal clarity and budget performance. These findings indicate that 
employees are dependent on information and support in order to increase performance. These 
factors seems to be the key concern to handle when operating in a goal-setting theory 
perspective.  
Agency theory was also not found to have a strong predictive ability to explain budget 
performance. This might be due to the fact that little previous research has examined this area 
with a survey approach. Therefore, the authors were forced to operationalize constructs from 
agency theory into questions without been backed up by previous research. In two cases 
correlations were found between variables from goal-setting theory and agency theory. 
Budgetary feedback was found to have a positive relationship with economic satisfaction and 
budget goal clarity was found to have a positive relationship with information asymmetry. This 
finding further underlines the important and multifaceted nature of information in budgeting. 
The results implicate that employees with clearly defined goals have valuable information 
regarding their performative capabilities that are unknown to their superiors. The variables from 
agency theory did show high mean and median scores, indicating that the respondents generally 
agreed with the statements from agency theory about how people behave and act in budget 
environments. The respondents did tend to prefer lower risk to higher risk and that 
compensation was important for motivation. 
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None of the theories seems to fully be able to explain how budget performance is increased 
even though they ways of goal-setting theory seems to be more connected to increased 
performance. Both theories have a solid theoretical base which contains both pros and cons. 
Goal-setting theory has an optimistic view of people in general, where participation, feedback 
and clarity is intended to motivate people to direct attention and arouse effort by information 
sharing. Agency theory assumes individuals as self-serving people that strive for their own 
maximized utility. Therefore, agency theory is more focused on how to control the agents in 
order to direct interest and effort. Higher budget difficulty is in goal-setting theory used to 
increase performance, while it according to agency theory might result in slack because of 
individuals being risk-averse. Both of these outcomes needs to be accounted for in order to 
control the effect of increased budget goal difficulty. Budget participation is another key factor 
of goal-setting theory, but can the principal expect agents to share all necessary information? 
According to agency theory there is need for budget based incentives to lower information 
asymmetry in the relationship between principal and agent. This is another key point where the 
theories does not entirely comprehend the whole picture when examined individually. To fully 
explain budget performance, a combined approach could potentially better model how 
companies should act to increase performance. 
The contribution of this study is to provide some evidence of potential interdependencies and 
connections between elements of agency theory and goal-setting theory, and budget 
performance. Thereby contributing to bridging the gap between psychology and economics in 
MAR. 
6.1 Limitations 
There are some factors that can have had an impact on the results of this study. The paper is 
limited by a simple choice of method when relying on correlations to attain its results. Because 
of this choice it is not possible to find relationships between the chosen variables that might 
need to be accounted for. Each variable is instead to a high degree examined only on an 
individual level. It is also difficult to account for confounding variables. There could potentially 
exist variables that are not included in the method which have an impact on the results of this 
study. Both goal-setting and agency theory has an established and well researched theoretical 
framework but could still suffer from such variables that have been left out. There is also a 
problem in the fact that the survey was only answered by a limited amount of respondents and 
the statistical certainty of the results can suffer from such a restricted number. The convenience 
sample that was used is this study makes it difficult to generalize the results to the greater 
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population. Therefore, this study is rather meant to present implications of the most important 
aspects of the chosen theories.  
6.2 Suggestions for future research 
This study has contributed to the MAR literature by bridging the gap between psychology and 
economics. Since the result is intended to be interpreted as indications it cannot be seen as 
generalizable, future research could focus on examining similar propositions by using a 
probability sample with an increased number of respondents. Another improvement would be 
to expand the statistical method to include an interactive model that not only examines each 
variable individually but looks at the relationship between them as well.  
Goal-setting and agency theory is only two of many theories that has been widely used to 
describe budgeting within MAR and there are many others that have had an impact on 
budgeting. There is need for expanding research not only to goal-setting and agency theory, but 
to also include other eminent theories within the field.  
One of the most central discoveries of this paper is that goal-setting and agency theory might 
present suboptimal ways to understand budget performance when used individually. Future 
research could do well from experimenting with both theories to form a combined approach 
which takes the important aspects of both theories into account.  
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8. Appendix 
8.1 Appendix A - Tables 
 
 
8.2 Appendix B - Survey 
Survey 
Vänligen ange om du är man eller kvinna (man, kvinna) 
Vänligen ange ålder 
Jag är delaktig i sättandet av mina budgetmål. ( 1: Instämmer inte alls – 7: Instämmer helt) 
Mina budgetmål är svåra att uppnå. (1: Instämmer inte alls – 7: Instämmer helt) 
Jag får utförlig återkoppling (feedback) gällande min prestation för att uppnå budgetmål (1: 
Instämmer inte alls – 7: Instämmer helt) 
Mina budgetmål är tydliga och specifika. Jag vet exakt vilka mina budgetmål är(1: 
Instämmer inte alls – 7: Instämmer helt) 
Jag får en prestationsbaserad ersättning baserad på mitt uppfyllande av budgetmål (Ja, Nej) 
I mitt arbete blir jag mer motiverad att prestera när min prestation ökar min ekonomiska 
ersättning (1: Instämmer inte alls – 7: Instämmer helt) 
Jag är nöjd med min ekonomiska ersättning 
Jag föredrar investeringar med lägre men säker avkastning framför investeringar som är 
potentiellt lönsammare men mer riskfyllda (1: Instämmer inte alls – 7: Instämmer helt) 
Jag har bättre information än mina överordnade om hur nära mina budgetmål är min 
prestationskapacitet (1: Instämmer inte alls – 7: Instämmer helt) 
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I budgetarbetet delar jag med mig kunskaper till mina överordnade om hur väl mina 
budgetmål motsvarar min prestationskapacitet (1: Instämmer inte alls – 7: Instämmer helt) 
Vilket av följande alternativ beskriver bäst hur budgetmål sätts på ditt företag (Överordnade 
sätter budgetmål och kommunicerar dessa neråt i organisationen, Överordnade och 
underordnade sätter budgetmål tillsammans, Underordnade sätter budgetmål och 
kommunicerar dessa uppåt i organisationen) 
Jag uppnår mina budgetmål. (1: Instämmer inte alls – 7: Instämmer helt) 
 
Survey (translated into English) 
Please state your gender (Man, Woman) 
Please state your age 
I am allowed a high degree of influence in the determination of my budget goals .( 1: I do not 
agree at all – 7: I Agree completely) 
My budget goals are quite difficult to attain ( 1: I do not agree at all – 7: I Agree completely) 
I receive a considerable amount of feedback about my achievements concerning by budget 
goals ( 1: I do not agree at all – 7: I Agree completely) 
My budget goals are very clear and specific ( 1: I do not agree at all – 7: I Agree completely) 
I receive economic compensation based upon my fulfillment of budget goals (Yes, No) 
In my work I become increasingly motivated to perform if my performance increases my 
economic compensation ( 1: I do not agree at all – 7: I Agree completely) 
 I am satisfied with my economic compensation ( 1: I do not agree at all – 7: I Agree 
completely) 
I prefer investments with lower but certain return to investments that are potentially more 
profitable but with higher risk ( 1: I do not agree at all – 7: I Agree completely) 
I have superior information compared to my superiors regarding how close my budget goals 
are to my performance capacity limit ( 1: I do not agree at all – 7: I Agree completely) 
In the budget process I share information to my superiors regarding how my budget goals 
corresponds to my performance capacity ( 1: I do not agree at all – 7: I Agree completely) 
What following alternative best describe the budget setting process at your company 
(Management set budget goals and communicate these downwards in the organization, 
Management and employees set budget goals together, Employees set budget goals and 
communicate these upwards in the organization) 
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 I reach my budget goals ( 1: I do not agree at all – 7: I Agree completely) 
 
 
